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.Although the trial court correctly determined that the
lease had terminated and did not, as defendants contend,
err in omitting findings above discussed, it did err in determining that defendants have no right whatsoever in the real
property and that plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession.
Therefore, the judgment is reversed. Each party shall bear
its own costs on appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred .
.Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 26,
1952.

[Sac. No. 6262.

In Bank.

June 10, 1952.]

CALIFORNIA-WESTERN STATES LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
COMMISSION and CELESTINO AGUILAR, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Liens.-An erroneous order of the
Industrial Accident Commission denying claim of employer's
unemployment disability insurance carrier for a lien against
the State Compensation Insurance Fund, carrier of the employer's workmen's compensation insurance, cannot be saved
by the latter carrier's payment, before the original order had
become final, of compensation against which the lien should
have been allowed, so as to defeat the unemployment disability insurance carrier's right to such lien.
[2] !d.-Award-Collateral Attack.-Under Lab. Code, § 5302,
any award of the Industrial Accident Commission is completely
immune from collateral attack after the 20th day, even though
in excess of its jurisdiction.
[3] Id.-Award-Conclusiveness.-Lab. Code, § 5302, declaring
that all orders and awards of the Industrial Accident Commission are conclusively presumed to be reasonable and lawful
unless modified or set aside within the time and in the manner prescribed, was not intended to prevent effective recon[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 197.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4 J Workmen's Compensation, § 197;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 201; [3] Workmen's Compensation, § 199.
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sideration by the commission or review by the courts of awards
which erroneously deny lien claims.
!d.-Liens.-vVhere
the State Compensation Insurance Fund
[4]
illegally pays the entire amount of compensation to the injured
employe after it has notice that the employer's unemployment
disability insurance carrier claims a lien against it, it remains
liable to such carrier for the amount of such lien, and the
Industrial Accident Commission may order the State Fund
to pay the lien.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying claim of employer's unemployment
insurance carrier for lien against State Compensation Insurance Fund. Order annulled.
'
Sidney L. Weinstock, H. Harold Leavey and J. Richard
Glade for Petitioner.
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., Robert Ball and T. Groezinger
for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner, carrier of employer's unemployment disability insurance under a voluntary plan (Unemployment Insurance Act, 3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d,
art. 10, pt. 6) seeks review of an award of the Industrial
Accident Commission which denies petitioner's claim for a
lien against the State Compensation Insurance Fund, carrier
of the employer's workmen's compensation insurance. The
commission concedes, as it must, that its original order denying
the lien was beyond its jurisdiction because contrary to Bryant
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1951), 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32].
Before the original order became :final the workmen's compensation insurance carrier paid the entire amount of compensation to the employe; the Industrial Accident Commission then granted a rehearing. The commission takes the
position that although petitioner's lien claim against the
workmen's compensation insurance carrier should have been
allowed it has now been lost because the latter carrier, before
the original order had become :final, paid out the compensation
against which the lien should have been allowed. We cannot
sustain this position.
The particular facts which gave rise to this controversy are
as follows: On October 3, 1949, Celestino Aguilar sustained
an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and which resulted in disability. The State Fund, work-
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men's compensation insurance carrier for the employer, paid
Aguilar temporary disability compensation until March 31,
1950, then discontinued payments because of a dispute as to
the nature and extent of disability. On April 19, 1950,
Aguilar filed with the Industrial Accident Commission an
application for adjustment of claim and, on the same date,
petitioner commenced paying Aguilar unemployment compensation disability benefits of $25 a week.
Petitioner, with Aguilar's consent, requested the Industrial
Accident Commission to allow a lien against any award of
workmen's compensation. A copy of the request for and
consent to allowance of lien was served on the State Fund on
May 24, 1950, and filed on May 29, 1950. On October 10,
1950, the Industrial Accident Commission awarded Aguilar
$1,050 permanent partial disability compensation ($30 a week
for 35 weeks commencing April 9, 1950) less $60 as a fee for
Aguilar's attorneys, and denied petitioner's request for allowance of a lien. The denial of lien was based on the commission's announced policy to deny liens for unemployment compensation disability benefits against permanent disability compensation; the question whether such policy could be upheld
was then pending on review in the Bryant case. The State
Fund paid Aguilar the $1,050 on October 26, 1950. On
October 30 an application for rehearing was filed. The Industrial Accident Commission granted a rehearing and withheld
action pending final disposition of the Bryant case. After the
Bryant decision ( st~pra, 37 Cal.2d 215), the Industrial Accident Commission issued its decision in this case; it allowed
petitioner's claim of lien against Aguilar but denied its claim
against the State Fund.
As stated above, the Industrial Accident Commission concedes that under the Bryant case its decision on October 10,
1950, was in excess of its jurisdiction, but contends that nevertheless the petitioner is unable to claim a lien against the
workmen's compensation insurance carrier. The Industrial
Accident Commission relies on several Labor Code provisions.
Section 5903 provides that within 20 days after service of an
Industrial Accident Commission award a person aggrieved
may attack it by petition to the Industrial Accident Commission for reconsideration. Section 5950 provides that within
30 days after disposition of a petition for reconsideration, or
reconsideration on the Industrial Accident Commission's own
motion, any !Jcrson affected by the award may seek review by
the District Court of Appeal or this court. Section 5302
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provides that Industrial Accident Commission awards are
"prima facie lawful and conclusively presumed to be reasonable and lawful, until and unless they are modified or set
aside" within the time and manner provided by law. Section
3603 provides that payment of compensation in accordance
with the order of the Industrial Accident Commission discharges the employer from all claims therefor.
In the present action the award of workmen's compensation
was paid by the State Fund on the 16th day after the award
was made, and the petition for rehearing was filed on the 20th
day. The Industrial Accident Commission argues that its
award was presumed valid until attacked (Lab. Code, § 5302),
that no attack had been made as of the 16th day, and that the
payment by the State Fund thus relieved the latter from
liability (Lab. Code, § 3603). [1] Petitioner contends that
an erroneous award cannot be saved by payment by the workmen's compensation insurance carrier before the award becomes finaL Petitioner's argument is sound. [2] Under
section 5302 any award is completely immune from collateral
attack after the 20th day, even though in excess of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission. The policy
underlying this rule is that it assures workmen that the awards
are paid speedily and with certainty. (Thaxter v. Finn
(1918), 178 Cal. 270, 275 [173 P. 163].) [3] But section
5302 cannot have been intended to prevent effective reconsideration by the commission or review by the courts of awards
which erroneously deny lien claims. If the section were given
the effect for which the commission contends, then the commission (by denying liens) and the workmen's compensation
insu~ance carrier (by immediately paying awards to impecunious claimants) could nullify the legislative intent which
was pointed out and upheld in the Bryant decision (supra,
37 Cal.2d 215, 219: an unemployed workman should not
receive workman's compensation and unemployment benefits
for the same period of disability) in every case wherein a
claim of lien for unemployment benefits has been established
before the Industrial Accident Commission.
[4] Finally, the Industrial Accident Commission asserts
that it cannot order the State Fund to pay the amount of the
lien to petitioner because, by statute, the commission can allow
the lien only against ''any amount to be paid as com pen-·
sation" (Lab. Code, § 4903) ; the commission argues that, after
the October 26th payment by the State Fund, there was no
''amount to be paid as compensation'' upon which the lien
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could be impressed. This argument assumes that the award
was properly paid by the State Fund. Since the State Fund
illegally paid the compensation award after notice that petitioner claimed a lien, the State Fund remains liable to the
petitioner. (See Johnson v. Ind1tstrial Ace. Com. (1935),
2 Cal.2d 304, 307 [40 P .2d 518] .)1 In similar situations it is
uniformly held that a debtor pays his creditor at his peril
after notice of garnishment or assignment. (See Bliss v. California Cooperative Prod~wers (1947), 30 Cal.2d 240, 250
[181 P.2d 369, 170 A.L.R. 1009]; Finch v. Finch (1909),
12 Cal.App. 274, 280 [107 P. 594]; In re Kling (1919),
44 Cal.App. 267, 270 [186 P. 152] .)
For the reasons above stated the award after rehearing is
annulled and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Accident
Commission for proceedings in accord with this opinion.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion in this case is predicated on Bryant
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.2d 215 [231 P.2d 32] (see, also,
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 38 Cal.2d 599
[241 P.2d 530]) and for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in that case, I cannot agree that a lien is allowable here.

1Cf. State Camp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1949), 89 Cal.
App.2d 821, 824 [202 P.2d 86]. There an application for compensation
came before the commission, and the compensation insurance carrier
accepted the commission's permanent disability rating and commenced to
make installment payments as ordered. The employe then applied for
adjustment of compensation. A hearing was had on October 22, 1947,
when the employe for the first time was represented by an attorney.
On October 22, $225 in permanent disability as originally rated remained
to be paid. Findings and award were not filed until January 26, 1948;
meanwhile the insurer, pursuant to the original rating, had paid the $225.
· No claim of lien by the attorney was on file. The January 26 award
purported to require the insurer to pay $225 less $35 payable as
attorney's fees. The District Court of Appeal concluded that the commission could not require the insurer to pay an independent award of
$35 to the attorney. It expressly pointed out that it was not passing on
the situation where a written notice of lien claim was on file.

